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ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF U. S. WAR POTENTIAL
A lecture delivered by

Dr.

Bertrand Fox

at the Naval War College
October 6, 1949

My topic this morning is "Economic Elements of the U. S.
War Potential." As you can·imagine, it is a tremendous topic and
I am going to have to skim fairly lightly and rapidly over many
phases of it. I will talk in fairly general terms and hope that vari
ous specific details can be brought out later in the question period.
I want to deal with the topic in three major headings and, if there
is time, to add one additional topic.
My first of the three headings is "The determinants of maxi
mum overall production potential." The first point I want to
make is to dispose of money. In peacetime, the magnitude of what
is produced in the aggregate, and for any particular segment of the
ecomomy the maximum of a given thing that can be produced, de
pends upon money demand. Therefore, we think of money as be
ing of tremendous importance to the volume of production. In war
time, however, if the country is solidly behind you, there is no
problem of appropriations such as you have in peacetime. There
is no problem that is really difficult relative to raising the money
to buy what has to be produced. The government will provide the
demand with money that can come either through taxes, borrow
ing, or if necessary, various other inflationary means.
Money itself is not a limiting factor in war production
that is something that can be disposed of fairly easily. We do use
money, howeve;, as a general measure, and I will keep referring
today to a particular magnitude that we call gross national product,
Doctor Fox is professor of Business Administration at Harvard Uni
versity. He has been a consultant to the Munitions Board and Na
tional Security Resources Board since 1947.
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which is the sum total in value terms of all the goods and services
produced in this country. That is the measure we use of the total
level of pl'()duction. It is measured in terms of money because you
cannot add tanks, ships, and yards of cloth. We have to have a
common denominator, and for this we use money. But as far as I
a.m �oncerned and from the point of view of this presentation, we
can dispose of money.
The real determinants of production come down to the basic
and physical factors of production, and I want to deal with each very
rapidly. First, the human factor-labor. Out of any given popu
lation, the labor force actually is a small fraction-less than half.
Out of our population today of approximately one hundred forty to
one hundred forty-five million people, OU:f labor force. is somewhere
around sixty to sixty-five million people. Now the magnitude of
the labor force depends on the composition of the population. Rus
sia with a much larger population has a smaller labor force. They
are in a stage of a rapidly growing population. We are in a stage.
of greater stability of population1 The greater the stability of
the population, the less rapid is the growth, hence the larger is
the proportion which is in the working age group. So you have to
consider not only the population, but also its age distribution and
its composition. Our labor force today is somewhere around sixty
two to sixty-five million people.
The second element we have to think of is the degree of
employment of that labor force. We hear all kinds of talk of
"full employment". The term "full employment" is· really "high
level employment". If we ever reached a point of full employment,
our whole system would be completely. rigid with no mobility or
flexibility. Full employment really implies: "With a sixty million
labor force-somewhere around one to two million unemployed."
They were the float. That's the group that provides the flexibility
38
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to shift from job to job as the production of certain things is
stepped· up and other things are curtailed.
In war time, at the peak of employment during World War

II, we got down to a figure of a.bout eight hundred thousand un
employed. At that stage our whole system was tight and rigid.

The problem of staffing various munitions lines which were on the
upswing, of transferring workers from the lines where production
was to decline to those where we needed more workers was a ter
ribly difficult job with that degree of unemployment. Ordinarily
we need somewhat more than that to provide the flexibility re
quired in a changing production pattern.
The third element is the amount of time workers are em
ployed. Here, I think, today the average work week, taking days
off and things of that kind, is somewhere around 35 hours a week.

I think the standard forty-hour week now has gone by the boards
somewhat. With that length work week, again we have more
flexibility for expansion, because the stepping-up of the work week
is easier. If we are already working a 48 or 54 hour week, the
possibility of flexibility to step it up is much more limited. In the
last war we had an average increase in hours per worker of up to
25 to 35 per cent, because we had that flexibility. There is not
that same flexibility in nations which are already working the much
longer work week.
In addition to those broad elements in the labor force. we
have to think:'" of a special problem in wartime, because probably
the most able and the most vigorous of the labor force is drained
into the military service. Also in wartime, the need for particular
kinds of skill is much greater. The shift is to hard goods pro
duction and out of soft goods. The need for mechanical skills is
much greater. But again, those same skills are needed in the
armed forces, and the problem in wartime to get those particular
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skills-to get them

ly difficult.

in the places where they are needed--,-is extreme

The training problem in wartime-the training of the

type of workers which are needed for the particular production line,
is one of the most difficult of the mobilization problem.

In addition we must consider a particular kind of labor group

-the supervisory skills. In our mass production type industry, the

supervisors play a very important role.

Again they are the same

type who make good non-coms and good officers.

They are taken

rapidly, and the upgrading that goes on to get the required super
visory personnel in production, raises very difficult problems.

We

could go on to many other aspects of that, but I have to skim
lightly.

The second major factor is

natural resources.

And again

I want to mention two specifically-agricultural land is the first.

In a war period, the need for food is considerably greater for the

same group of people eating than it is in peacetime.

Believe it or

not, the military consumption of food per capita is considerably

greater than civilian consumption per capita.
in production is to hard goods production.

In wartime the shift

With more vigorous

work, the need of food per person is greater. Again, almost inevit

ably, you have an inflationary pressure during the war.
have more money to spend.

They want more food.

People

For exam

ple, back in 1939 there were about 47 per cent of the families in the

United States whose annual income was one thousand dollars per

year or less.

During the war this average income almost doubled.

I assure you there is considerable room for an expansion of diet

when you start with a family earning a thousand dollars a year.

Hence the need for agricultural land, because of the greater

pressure on agricultural land during a war period, is very great,

and the food problem in war is of very great importance.·

Second, a general group of things you have heard much

about already-materials. Most of the talk of materials before the

40
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss5/4

RESTRICTED
4

Fox: Economic Elements of U.S. War Potential

RESTRICTED

last war, and still to a considerable extent today, is in terms of a
group which we call strategic or critical materials. To my mind
they are infinitely less important than another group. No nation
can be a strong industrial· nation and a strong war power without
what I think of as basic materials-steel, copper, aluminum, rubber,
the chemical industry, oil (natural or synthetic), and power. These
are the key materials-the key resources, as far as the war econ
omy is concerned, and to my mind considerably more attention
should be given to the readiness of these material industries in
peace time as a possible preparation for war than to give almost
exclusive concern to the strategic and critical list where stock
piling is the temporary solution.
The third major factor is productive equipment-industrial
plant and machinery. In this country we have a larger volume of
machinery and equipment per worker than in any other country
in the world, an.d it accounts for our very great productivity per
man. Our productivity is about twice that of the highest Euro
pean country. During the war, in .comparison with Russia, we had
about three to four times the productivity per man, and about five
to six times the productivity per man as compared to Japan. That
is largely accounted for by the machinery and equipment which each
man has to use, and also by the skills with which the men are co
ordinated and the production process is integrated. Production
equipment of all kinds is a yery key element, but there is . one in
particular that I want to emphasize. That is the machine tool in
dustry, which makes the machines which produce the goods we
want. We have the largest and most highly efficient machine
tool industry in the world. If we are going to have the possibility of
shifting production lines from one product to another, in which we
have to retool, then if the machine tool industry is not up to snuff,
our flexibility is greatly limited. We have heard the term "armed
in depth". Armed economically in depth is of equal importance,
RESTRICTED
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·· and for that we need a machine tool industry.

The shift, for ex-' ·

ample, from the B-17 to the B-29 would have been impossible with

out an effective machine tool industry because the tooling had to be

completely different.

Practically all tools, that is the big machine

tools, were scrapped from the B-17 lines when the B-29's came in.
Where rapid shifts are required to improved types of muni

tions, they can be produced only if we have the tools.

If we have

an effective machine tool industry, such shifts can be made rap
idly, as they were.

To my mind, Russia's greatest weakness at the

moment is its lack of a really first class machine tool industry. Dur
ing the last war we provided the bulk of their machine tools.

Today·

they are doing everything possible to get machine tools from us. But

the idea is to have the "know-how" to make the tools, to make the
things we want, and that is a very critical element in our war po
tential.

Another element is the size of our preduction units.

This

question of the size of the largest units, creates all kinds of prob

lems of control of industry, charges of monopoly, and things of that
type.

But in wartime, I can assure you, they are a boon, because

the large production units have a facility for organizing big produc

tion jobs and for integrating all of the steps in the production pro
c�ss.

Giving a contract to a large unit like General Motors means

that you put on the shoulders of General Motors the problem of in
tegrating a production job, in lining up the subcontractors, in lining

up the materials, and getting all the'parts of it tied in together. If
that had to be done almost entirely from a central point, the control

job would be almost impossible; hence time after time, during the

war, many thanks were given for the size of many of our production
units.

A fourth factor, and one of vital importance is managerial,

ability.

This comes down to the skill of integrating the various

42
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other produ�tion factors, in devising. means by which they can· be
made more effective, and. in supervising and integrating the whole
flow of the production process. We are again very fortunate in
our type of economic system to have probably the best·. training
ground possible for the development of ·managers. . Our skill at

management· and oqr management "know-how" are the envy of

the world. Without that "know-how" in management techniques,
our whole system would be considerably less effective. And that
consists, to a very great extent, in the ability to break a job up into

its detailed component parts, .and to be. able to fit men and machines
to a job iii the most effective fashion. Where you have the prob

lem of many l;VOrkers being unskilled and not trained for a particu
lar' job. in war time, the need for breaking each task up· into its sim
plest elements is of even greater importance than in peace time. And

the fact �hat our management techniques, our production techa.
niques of a mass production character, do break complicated jobs up
into simple elements, meant that the problem
of training :workers
.
was considerably easier.

.

.

Finally, one additional point is research-scientific ability,
scientific skills and technological research. "If you don't keep up,
you are lost." At various- times you have heard that phrase. You

have to either be ahead scientifically, o.r lose. New production tech
niques, new weapons, new materials, new ways to substitute for
things· that are scarce, all are a part of the technological scientific
problem which I just want to mention as vital.
Those in general are the fundamental factors, the basic fac
tors, which determine the maximum to which our economy. could go
in reaching its top. How do we attain it? What are the measures
to attain maximum: production in war time? The first thing I want
to point out is that we cannot rely on the type of incentives and
motives that exist in peace time. In peace time, our system is what
we. call "a profit economy". Resources, both human and physic�l,
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move into those lines . of production whic:ti offer the· possibility · of
the greatest return. If a thing is scarce in relation to what people
want, there is a tendency to bid its price up, to make that line more
profitable. Additional firms come into the business or old firms
expand. Perhaps the possibility opens of paying higher wages to
. attract more workers ; hence the incentives for movement of re
sources in a peace time system is the opportunity of greater wages,
greater profits, and a greater return per capita. We cannot rely
. on that in war time. The problem in war time is the shift from
peace time pursuits to munitions production. True, the govern
ment, in buying munitions may quote a. price which offers a better
than�average profit and which enables the new munitions lines to
offer ,higher wages to attract workers. To an extent, that type of
natural or normal incentive �an be used, but it is limited for this
reason. As �e pay more to workers and as equipment gets a great
er return, they have · greater income. But at the. same time re
_sources are shifted. from peace time prod�cts, hence the supply of
those products is reduced. If incomes are higher, people can buy
more. Tlie inevitable result is that the prices of peace time products
will tend to rise, and we are back in the same place we started, be
cause then those producers can raise wages to attract workers and
resources are. attracted back again. Or, it becomes a kind of a
"step" proposition with greater and greater inflation. We cannot
rely solely on the profit motive in war time to get the shift of re
sources needed. Secondly, there is a natural apathy to shift to
munitions industries for a war period of indeterminate length from
a line of work·that you are used to and to which you want to re
turn after the war. No worker with an established home wants
to uproot himself .and his family and move to the new areas of
munitions production, which perhaps are on the coast or far away
from his old home in new areas where housing is not adequate. It
. takes a very major incentive to get those shifts. We have to rely
on something more than the normal incentives of. peace time pro44
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duction. We have to establish central controls, and the controls
have to be operated ·from a central point in order to force the
necessary shifts.
Now what controls are needed, and what is the objective of
the use of such controls? The first stage of the process is the cen
tral plan. In a war time picture, especially today, it is a problem
of planning for the utilization of total resources. It is not sim
ply a question of a military production plan. It is a control plan
for the entire economy, It is a total-control program. The first
stage of it, of course, is the formulation of military requirements
-the traiislation of the strategic and operational plans into logis
tic requirements, and these in turn into production requirements
for the various types of munitions and allied products required. But
in the formulation of the overall plan, I would like to stress very
strongly, that there is great need for integrated individual plans
developed cooperatively and simultaneously, involving three ele
ments-namely, the strategic and logistic elements; second, the
economic elements, involving what resources are available and how
they can be mobilized or utilized; and third, the political elements.
The latter involves questions of what kind of an economy we are
going to have, the degree of belt-tightening possible and still retain
a healthy civilian economy, the possibility of war time and post-war
stability, and the effects of various actions on the ultimate trans.;
ition to the postwar semi-normalcy. The three types of decisions,
the three types of plans must be developed simultaneously, con
currently and. cooperatively; The time wasted in World War II, in
separate planning and in a kind of a resistance towards working
together intimately between the political groups-represented
primarily by the President and Congress-the civilian production
groups�the War Production Board, the Office of War Mobiliza'
tion, etc.-and the military services, cost us a great deal of time and
many- errors. Today, the organization, at least, for mobilization
RESTRICTED
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planning, the National Security Resources Board and the National
Security Council, provides for that mutual exc'hange. I want to em
phasize very strongly that that is the only way in which the plan·
can be developed most effectively. We must have a unity in the
planning groups and an. intimate interchange of ideas as the basis
on which the total plan is to be developed.·
Even so, the first to be developed must be the military plan:
That, in turn, has to be judged against the availability of resources
of the particular kinds required, when and where, plus the general
political appraisal as to how much and how fast the civilian econ
omy is to 'be disrupted. Perhaps we discover that the military pro
gram can be achieved as it stands. Perhaps modifications are nec
essary, and then it is a process of steady give and take. The size
of the program, military or otherwise, has to be large enough to.
provide a real incentive to get the wheels going hard and fast At
the same time, it can't be so large that we have to commit all of our
resources in a rigid program at once with insufficient flexibility for
later adjustment and change. Change in war time is inevitable. We
have to have some flexibility to make those changes, yet the entire
1;>rogram must be large enough to provide the drive to achieve maxi
mum production. President Roosevelt, in his message in early 1942,
called for the production in 1942 of sixty thousand planes, forty
five thousand tanks, a huge number of ships and other munitions in
balance. He· called for one hundred twenty-five thousand planes
and seventy-five thousand tanks in 1943. These goods were so huge
that everybody practically threw in the sponge until they saw he
meant it, and then they got behind it That was the inceJ.!tive pro
gram, the high goal, that was needed at that stage to really get ac
tion and the economy mobilized. As far as numbers are concerned,
neither goal was achieved. But if you want to add, for instance,
the pounds of aircraft in the type of planes that were in existence
in 1942 when he made the statement, both of those goals were exRESTRICTED
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss5/4
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But in the in

terval, there were so many changes, such as increased weight of
planes and types of planes, ships and tanks, that as far as the num
bers went, the goals were not reached.

Once a program is established, the control system has to be

geared and meshed into that. That requires a variety of things.
One is a series of limitation orders.

Generally the only way in

which we can get shifts of resources is to prohibit the production
of the things frpm which we want resources to move, so we say,

"No more automobiles." When you can produce no more automobiles,

the automobile manufacturers and workers will willingly produce

munitions.

The first set of controls, then, is limitation orders, either

prohibiting the production of an end-item or §topping the use of

a particular type of material in the end-item which often stops pro

duction.

Second, are established priorities which direct the flow of

components, materials and equipment to particular products which
are most in demand.

If the supply of a material is greater than

the demand for it in high priority stuff, the demands of the key
items can be met . by simple priorities.

As soon, however, as the

total priority demands equal the 'total supply or exceed it, priorities

will no longer do the job of material control. Then you have to in

stitute an allocation system-a detailed precise system of alloca

tions to direct the flow of particular amounts of a material, so
many tons of steel or pounds of aluminum to each particular end use.

When things get even tighter, at. times we have to use also pro

duction scheduling to take into account in more detail the needs
of each particular production line, so that no matter how urgently

the end product is needed, we don't flow more to its production than
can be used.

These comprise a very tight, integrated set of pro-
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duction controls, but a variety of others have to be used to direct
. the economy, such as monetary controls, fiscal controls, price con
trols, rationing and man power controls, and these must be in
tegrated in with the material and resources controls.

Typically, it is easier to control the flow of materials and

to establish programs in terms of a common denominator of ma

terials than in terms of man power or in terms of. price and so on.

These other controls, therefore, must be integrated into the pro
duction control system rather than vice versa.

That integration

was never successful in World War II, and is one that is being

studied very carefully now.

Two other things should be mentioned briefly in the steps

to achieve maximum output. One is, what is the information you

have to have to run this set of controls, this central planning? In

any business you have a detailed accounting system and a set of
internal records.

General statistics are to the economy what ac

counting or bookkeeping data are to an individual business.

But

the problems of obtaining statistical data from the economy as a

whole are infinitely greater and present some of the greatest dif
ficulties in central planning.

Peace time mobilization planning

should keep alive the statistical and informational tools, in order
that decisions can be made most easily when needed.

Finally, the personnel in the central planning group must be

considered.

There is no ideal peace time training to provide per
sonnel for the planning which is needed in war time. The problems
are over-all in character. Most of our business executives think
too narrowly in terms of their own business and its problems. Here
the problem is the integration of steel with machine tools, with
tanks, with ships, with allocations, with rationing, and so on. It

is a broad overall conception. We don't train men that way. They
must, in addition, have great versatility and be able to shift rapid-

48
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Third, they. have to be able to

_work effectiv'ely under pressure, including the intense pressure
of criticism.

They have to be able to make those tough decisions.

They have to have the guts to do it and to do it fast.
to

have

the ability

to

They have

appraise a situation realistically even

though they realize that they can't get all the information that
is needed to make the best decisions.

Nevertheless they must

make the 'decisions with what information they have, and make
them_ fast.

More production men and less salesmen are needed in

The tire problem, one of the meanest during

the lower echelons.

the war, was run by a group of salesmen for a time. Everyone was

dissatisfied., A top-flight production man was recruited and things
cleared right up.

One of the toughest problems therefore, is to

get the right type of personnel to run the top planning effort.

The last general point I want to discuss is, "How large

a proportion· of this total production potential can be devoted to ·

war?" In part, that is a political decision, but one point we have .

to keep clearly in our minds. If the munitions production is to be at

its maximum, there must be a healthy civilian economy and war- ·

supporting economy.

Without it the efficiency of munitions pro

duction will decline., The difficulty is to determine what might be
called the marginal degrees of essentiality of various. parts of the

military, war-supporting and civilian programs and they vary with
the stage of the war effort.

If you take the position of "no

sacrifice for sacrifice sake but only when needed," then in the

earlier stages of a war production effort, the limiting factor is gen-

erally machine tools.
to munitions.
easily.

At that time all machine tools are diverted

Civilian production isn't hurt, but it can't grow

The second stage is generally critical materials-usually

hard material such as steel, copper, aluminum, and zinc.
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stage, the production of civilian hard products is cut. That,
again, does not hurt the standard of living too much. True, civil

ians can't get a new automobile, refrigerator, or radio, but they
can get enough food, clothing, etc.

The real pinch comes when the limiting factor becomes man

power. Then the shortage becomes general. At that stage the most

difficult allocation problems are reached. That is the stage we

had reached early in 1945, and things really looked tough for the
central control agencies. Up to that point the allocation problem was
not impossible.

The difficulty arises because there are no guides which can

be used to determine those degrees of essentiality.

play by ear to judge the problem.

Our most effective instrument

was .what we called the "squealometer".
alllocation

You have to

or program determination,

If in the process of an

we

achieved a uniform

pitch of ''.squeal" from all parties, we thought that the allocation had
been successful.

On the other hand, too often there was an at

tempt to increase pure munitions production at the expense of

the war-supporting activities, and we found that by starving the
railroads of steel plate to make additional tank cars, freight

cars, and box cars, we really ran into trouble in the latter part of
the war.

Then it had to be diverted out of munitions to such uses

in order to keep munitions rolling into the seaports.

At the peak of war production only about forty-five to

forty-eight per cent of steel output was devoted to pure munitions

production, but out of a total of about 65 million tons per year of

finished steel products, probably only about 20
to pure civilian uses.

thousand

tons went

The rest was of a war-supporting charac

ter, going for additional oil production, for rails, for maintenance,

repair, and operating supplies, for war related construction, for
electric power-all required to produce munitions and transport
them.

50
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,There is one additional point that I" want to make in this
connection. The length of time that is allowed to "reach peak pro
ductic�n is all-important in this type of decision. If there is time,
. it is possible to devote some steel and other critical materials to the
production of additional steel plants. However, it takes about
2½ tons of steel to build the capacity for one additional ton per
year .. · If there is time, it is possible to make the decision to build
more steel capacity. If there is not time, we can't afford to· de'
vote steel for the production of more steel or other types of ma..:
terial. So, time is a critical factor. in those decisions. Only if yeu
have time, is it possible to build more capacity to meet the peak
demands at a later stage.
I am not going to have time to go into the role of the
peace time planning agencies, but I do want to make one or· two final
points here.
I have taiked about the resources to achieve the maximum
potential. I want to emphasize one or two final ones, which seem of
great importance to me. We talk largely about things that per
haps we can put in balance sheets and use to compare one country
with another, such as facilities, materials, and things like that,
_all of which are very important. But, when the real, all-out pinch
comes, the key factors become things which we cannot put into
balance .sheets. Then it comes down to human factors and morale
factors, which include the effectiveness of those who are guiding
both the overall ·effort as well as the segments of that effort in
industry itself; their skill at integrating and coordinating the
production lines ; the brains and intelligence they have ; their skill
in devising production techniques, new ways of saving materials
and things of that kind; their skills to improvise, to substitute,
to find new and better ways of doing things. In other words, it
comes down in part to the effectiveness of management, both in
individual plants and in the central planning agencies.
RESTRICTED·
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Second, and perhaps more important is the morale of the
working force and the morale of the bosses of production jobs.
Jf their heart is solidly behind the job they are dding, if they
· are convinced that the job they are doing is as important or more
important than anything else, if they have confidence that what
they are producing is going to be used effectively by the military
services and not wasted, the effectiveness of their work will be
greatly enhanced. Their confidence in the use being made of the
products they are producing is vital to the morale and the effective
ness of the production effort. The activities of the services relative

to worker morale in the form of incentive programs· are extremely
important, but there was an awful lot of muttering and grumbling
later in the war in many areas. If the people as a whole are
solidly behind the production effort and morale is high, then in our
type of system, we can really go to town. If morale isn't high,
we will lose some of the power and drive behind that effort. It
comes down to the degree of unity behind the job that they are do
ing. If the people feel no immediate danger of attack and are not
afraid, if they . are seeing in the headlines that things are going
fine, and if they have money in their pockets-more money than
they ever had in · thejr lives before......;.they want to spend it and
they don't want to work in an all-out fashion. That is the time
morale counts in keeping the drive and the pressure behind the
job. In the last analysis wheft the pinch is really on, it's the
morale factor, it's the heart and the will of the people doing the
job that becomes the key factor in our war potential.
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